作者与机构
Chenfan Qu
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Yachao Liang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Mingqi Fang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Jiangwei Xie
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Zhenming Wang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Baoyue Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Changjiang Jiang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Zheng Chang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Fanli Jin
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Xuekang Zhu
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Kaiwen Feng
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Junchi Li
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Weihong Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Haoyue Wang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Chenfeng Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Yinan Xia
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Fangming Cui
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Yongshuo Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Dong Fan
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Jingjing Liu
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Tianyi Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Luobin Chen
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Ji-Zhe Zhou
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Sheng Li
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Wei Wang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Bin Li
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Ran He
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Xinpeng Zhang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Linna Zhou
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Jian Liu
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
Weiqiang Wang
GuangJian Team, Ant Group
Technical Committee on Digital Media Forensics and Security, CSIG
解决了什么问题
Venus-DefakerOne2 希望用一个二分类取证基础模型覆盖图像和视频中的数字伪造与物理呈现攻击。难点是在引入更多领域和困难样本时避免灾难性遗忘,同时不要求所有媒体都使用同一种预测接口。
关键结果
该论文报告称,深度伪造人脸的平衡准确度为 96.7%,AI 生成的图像为 93.3%,篡改的文档为 87.6%,操纵的自然图像为 89.6%,物理欺骗为 93.1%,AI 生成的视频为 96.0%。在这两个突出的广泛领域,物理伪造从 DefakerOne 的 60.8% 提高到 93.1%,AI 视频检测从 72.5% 提高到 96.0%。
摘要
现实世界的伪造本质上是异质的:它不仅表现为数字操纵,而且表现为物理欺骗,并且不仅通过图像也通过视频来传播。尽管取得了重大进展,但仍然缺乏涵盖如此广泛威胁范围的统一防伪基础模型。在本文中,我们提出了 Venus-DefakerOne2,它沿着伪造形式和媒体类型维度大幅扩展了取证能力边界。它经过数千万个开源和内部样本的训练,包含两个关键设计。 Tide-Style-Tuning 交替使用 LoRA 和全参数微调,以平衡计算效率、泛化和困难样本拟合,同时减轻灾难性遗忘。基于熵的测试适应通过分析预测熵来确定最佳预测模式。 Venus-DefakerOne2 在一系列全面的基准测试中实现了新的最先进的性能,包括 DeepFake 人脸 (96.7%)、人工智能生成的图像 (93.3%)、篡改文档 (87.6%)、操纵的自然图像 (89.6%)、物理欺骗 (93.1%) 和人工智能生成的视频 (96.0%)。它的性能显着优于专业专家模型及其前身 DefakerOne,成为二元决策取证任务的强大且多功能的基础模型。
研究出发点
操作伪造筛查涵盖深度伪造面孔、生成的图像和视频、编辑的文档、自然图像篡改和物理呈现攻击。单独的专业模型会增加集成成本,并可能在媒体和攻击形式之间留下不一致的盲点。
方法概述
该模型经过数千万个开源和内部样本的训练。 Tide-Style-Tuning 将参数高效的 LoRA 阶段与全参数微调交替,以在拟合硬案例的同时保持广泛的泛化性。基于熵的测试适应比较可用的预测模式并选择不确定性较低的路线;其他组件支持视频聚合和像素级定位。
论文总结
覆盖多种威胁的基础检测模型能简化多媒体审核系统,但其平均成绩横跨多个基准,训练还使用了内部数据。企业仍需验证不同攻击的阈值、分数校准、延迟,以及未见生成器和采集设备上的表现。